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INSURANCE
TomEs K lEEmRLiw, JR.*
Unfortunately for the writers of surveys such as this one the
cases decided on a given subject in a given year do not fall into
neat categories ready for orderly review and analysis. The
reviewer is faced with a number of cases most of which have
nothing in common with each other except that they fall or can
be forced into some recognized division area as broad as con-
tracts, property or, as here, insurance. It is difficult for the
author of a survey article to avoid the charge that he has done
nothing more than string together a number of case condensa-
tions. Occasionally, however, the reviewer is lucky enough to
find that several of the cases in his survey group have something
in common beyond merely falling within that broad group,
giving him an opportunity to develop an area. The format has
been here adopted of giving such an area a subtitle under which
a group of cases are outlined and commented upon. But of neces-
sity isolated cases remain to be reviewed and must be grouped
under the subtitle "Miscellaneous."
A. Coverage on Non-Owned Automobiles-E c ouons
Three cases decided during the survey period dealt with ex-
clusions under non-owned automobile coverage. Coverage on
non-owned automobiles has become almost standard in automo-
bile insurance policies. Its purpose is to give an insured who has
coverage on a described, owned automobile protection when the
insured uses a non-owned automobile. Such insurance is afforded
in recognition of the fact that an insured may from time to time
use automobiles which are not protected by the type coverage
which he carries on the vehicle described and covered by his
policy. An insurer is willing to cover such a non-owned auto-
mobile where the use by its insured is casual and the non-owned
automobile is of the type covered in the policy, in most situa-
tions a private passenger automobile. However, an insurer
does not wish this coverage to extend to a non-owned automo-
bile used regularly by an insured, since such an extension of
coverage could result in the risk to the insurer being greatly
increased. Therefore, after the grant of non-ownership cover-
* Lumpkin & Kemmerlin, Columbia, South Carolina.
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age, the insurer must undertake to limit it by exclusions.1 It is
interesting to note that in the years prior to this survey period
no case had ever come before the South Carolina Supreme Court
or a United States District Court for South Carolina interpret-
ing these policy provisions, whereas during the survey period of
one year three cases were decided involving such exclusions.
In Comner&4al Ins. Co. 'v. Gardner2 the insurer of Gardner
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it
afforded no coverage to Gardner under the liability provisions
of its policy covering Gardner's automobile for an accident
which occurred while Gardner was driving a police patrol car
furnished him by the city of Columbia, South Carolina, for use
in his job as a city patrolman. The city maintained a fleet of
patrol cars, and Gardner from time to time used various cars
from this fleet, spending a number of hours each week in one
or another of these cars. The policy language granted liability
coverage to Gardner for injury or damage to a claimant while
driving a non-owned automobile, but defined a non-owned auto-
mobile as one not furnished for his "regular use," and excluded
from non-owned automobile coverage use of a non-owned auto-
mobile "in any business or occupation of the insured except a
private passenger automobile operated or occupied by the named
insured." The insurer took the position that the police car was
furnished for "regular use," was used in Gardner's "business or
occupation," and was not a "private passenger automobile." The
court agreed and found for the insurer. The contention of
Gardner that since he used many different cars from the pool,
no one car, including the one he was driving at the time of the
1. Strictly speaking the limitation is not always an exclusion; it may be a
failure of inclusion, e.g., in Commercial Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 233 F. Supp. 884
(E.D.S.C. 1964), one of the cases discussed herein, the policy under considera-
tion undertook to pay liability claims "arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of the owned automobile or any non-owned automobile"; the policy then
defined a non-owned automobile as one "not owned by or furnished for the
regular use of either the named insured or any relative." To accomplish the
same result the policy under consideration in Glisson v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 246 S.C. 76, 142 S.E.2d 447 (1965), also one of the cases herein, under-
took to pay liability claims "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use
of the automobile," and defined "automobile" as the vehicle described in the
policy; the policy then under insuring agreement five extended certain cover-
ages including the liability coverage to "any other automobile" but provided
by exclusion that insuring agreement five would not apply "to any automobile
owned by . . .or furnished for regular use to the named insured or a member
of his household." The distinctions noted between inclusion and exclusion in
the policy language had no apparent bearing on the decisions reached in these
cases.
2. 233 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
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accident, was furnished for regular use was overruled. The
court relied upon the case of Voelker v. Travelers Indem. Co.3
which held that Voelker, who had liability coverage with the
defendant insurer, was not entitled under his non-owner's cov-
erage to protection for an accident which occurred while he was
driving a jeep returning from a two-week encampment with the
national guard of which he was a member. The court held the
jeep was furnished for his "regular use" even though he had
never driven the particular jeep before inasmuch as the entire
fleet of jeeps was subject to his use.
Glisson, v. State Farm Hut. Auto. In. Co.4 was an action
instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant, the insurer of
Clyde Cheezem, to collect on a judgment obtained against
Cheezem as a result of an accident which occurred when
Cheezem, driving a jeep as a part of his job while on temporary
active duty with the national guard, negligently injured the
plaintiff. Cheezem was a Methodist minister and earned his
livelihood in this profession, but while on temporary active duty
with the national guard he received compensation from federal
funds. At the time of the accident he was officer of the day and
was driving the jeep in that capacity. There was no evidence
before the court that Cheezem ever used an army vehicle other
than on the one day that he was officer of the day. The defend-
ant's policy, after extending liability protection on non-owned
automobiles, excluded from such extension automobiles "fur-
nished for regular use to the named insured" and "any automo-
bile while used in the business or occupation of the named
insured or spouse except a private passenger automobile oper-
ated or occupied by such named insured." Upon a decision in
favor of plaintiff, defendant appealed, asserting that the trial
judge erred in failing to find that the jeep was "furnished for
regular use" and in failing to find that such jeep was "used in
the business or occupation" of Cheezem. The "regular use"
argument was summarily put to rest by the court:
At the time of injury, Cheezem was temporarily engaged
in the duty of Officer of the Day, thus performing a dif-
ferent duty than that normally required of him. The 'jeep'
was not furnished for his regular use but, rather, was
assigned to him for use in performing the duty of Officer
3. 260 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1958).
4. 246 S.C. 76, 142 S.E.2d 447 (1965).
[Vol. 18
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of the Day. There is no evidence in the record as to how
frequently Cheezem used this 'jeep'; however, his use thereof
was necessarily limited as he could only use this vehicle if
it was properly dispatched to him.5
The "used in the business or occupation" argument gave the
court more trouble. The court reviewed a number of cases from
jurisdictions, including Voelker v. Travelers lndem. Oo., which
held that temporary national guard duty was an insured's
business or occupation within the meaning of an exclusion on a
non-owned automobile. Rejecting these cases and finding that
"business" or "occupation" means constant employment and
principal livelihood, the court held that Cheezem was not using
the jeep in his business or occupation and affirmed the decision
of the trial court. 6
In Grantham v. United States Fid. & Guar. 0o.7 the defendant
issued to Mrs. Charlotte Grantham its automobile insurance
policy which included medical payments coverage. The medical
payments coverage extended to non-owned automobiles, but con-
tained exclusion from coverage while an insured was riding in
an automobile "furnished for the regular use" of the insured or
relatives. Mrs. Grantham was killed while riding in a car owned
by Beaufort County which was being operated at the time of
her death by her husband, a deputy sheriff. The insured's hus-
band had been a deputy sheriff for six years prior to the acci-
dent and during that entire period had been furnished a county
automobile for business and personal use in Beaufort County.
However, he had no permission to drive this car on personal
business outside the county. The accident which gave rise to,
the claim occurred out of the county while the automobile was
5. The quoted language by emphasizing that Cheezem had never used the.
particular jeep in question rather than emphasizing that Cheezem had never
used any jeep perhaps indicates that the court would reject as "regular use" a
vehicle pulled from a pool available for regular use within the meaning of the
exclusion unless the particular vehicle pulled was regularly used, thus placing
this case in conflict with the Gardner case. In reaching its decision on this
point the Gardner case relied upon Voelker v. Travelers Indem. Co., which was
rejected by the court in the Glisson case now being surveyed on another point,
i.e., whether national guard duty is or is not business.
6. While the court did not consider the point, the clause of the policy before
it excluded coverage for an automobile used in "the business or occupation"
(emphasis added) of the insured, whereas the court in the Voelker case,
which held that temporary national guard duty was an insured's business or
occupation was considering an exclusion such as was before the court in the
Gardner case, which excluded coverage for an automobile used in "any business
or occupation" (emphasis added) of the insured.
7. 245 S.C. 144, 139 S.E.2d 744 (1965).
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being driven by the deputy sheriff on personal business. He
had, however, obtained special permission to make this trip out
of the county. The plaintiff sought to get around the "regular
use" clause by asserting that the automobile was not furnished
for regular use without the county. The court, on appeal by the
plaintiff from a finding for the defendant in the trial court,
rejected this theory, holding:
The fact that permission was obtained, or that this may have
been the first time the car was used to make a personal trip
out of the county, is not controlling under the facts of this
case. The undisputed facts are that the use, for which per-
mission was obtained, was of the same nature as that for
which the vehicle was provided and was entirely in accord
with the agreement under which it was furnished."
B. Ownership, Maintenance, or Use-What Constitutes Use
Two cases decided during the survey period considered
whether there was a "use" of a vehicle within the meaning of
coverage provisions of automobile insurance policies which re-
quired as a condition of coverage attaching that there be a loss
"arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of the insured
vehicle.
In "Wrenn & OutZaw, Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp.9
a Miss Coleman who had an automobile liability insurance
policy issued by the defendant was' injured when a bag boy
working for the plaintiff, Wrenn and Outlaw, Inc. (hereinafter
called Wrenn), slammed the door of her automobile on her hand
after loading the groceries she had purchased from Wrenn. Miss
Coleman sued Wrenn. Wrenn's insurer admitted it was liable
on the risk but asserted that under its policy the coverage
afforded Wrenn was excess over the policy written by the de-
fendant covering Miss Coleman's car. The defendant asserted
it had no liability under its policy with Miss Coleman. Wrenn's
insurer therefore proceeded to defend Miss Coleman's suit, and
after having lost it and paid off the judgment, brought this
action (under a loan receipt) in the name of its insured against
the defendant, seeking reimbursement for its loss in defending
and paying off the judgment to Miss Coleman. The lower court
8. Id. at 149, 139 S.E.2d at 747.
9. 246 S.C. 97, 142 S.E.2d 741 (1965).
[Vol. 18
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ruled against the plaintiff and the plaintiff appealed. The
South Carolina Supreme Court in reversing the case succinctly
outlined the coverage problem:
The principal issue before us is whether under the facts
of the case any coverage was afforded Wrenn under the
policy issued by Employers' to Mfiss Coleman. The policy
of Employers' provides coverage for legal liability to pay
damages because of bodily injury 'sustained by any person;
... arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the
owned automobile.' Insured against such liability, in addi-
tion to the named insured, is 'any other person using such
automobile, provided the actual use thereof is with the per-
mission of the named insured.' Also insured is, 'Any other
person or organization legally responsible for the use of an
owned automobile,... provided the actual use thereof is by
a person who is an insured under' the the terms of the policy.
Under definitions, the policy contains the following
language:
"'Use' of an automobile includes the loading and unload-
ing thereof."
There is no contention that the activity of the bag boy
here was not with permission of the named insured, Miss
Coleman, and the key question is whether the activity of the
bag boy as disclosed by the record constituted "use" of the
Coleman automobile within the meaning of the policy. If
his activity did constitute such use, the bag boy was insured,
and the policy clearly afforded coverage to Wrenn, since
Wrenn was legally responsible for the acts of its servant the
bag boy.10
The court then held the "use" was grocery shopping and in
grocery shopping it is necessary to load the groceries and loading
involves closing doors. Since the bag boy was using the car with
permission, and since Wrenn was responsible for his acts as
servant, coverage was present under the defendant's policy.
In Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Gup-
ton'1 the plaintiff, the insurer of Riggs Esso Service Station
(hereinafter called Riggs), brought a declaratory judgment
action seeking a determination that it owed no duty under its
10. Id. at 102, 142 S.E.2d at 743.
11. 241 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
1966]
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 16
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss1/16
SouTrH CAROLinA LAW REVIEW
policy issued to Riggs to appear and defend an action instituted
by the defendant Gupton against one Minnie Lou Williams, an
uninsured motorist. Minnie Lou Williams ran out of gas and
walked to the station of Riggs where Gupton, an employee of
Riggs, filled a can with gas. Gupton then took a truck owned by
Riggs on which the plaintiff had coverage and drove back to
Mrs. Williams' automobile. He parked the truck about six feet
behind her car and began pouring the gas into it while she tried
to start the car. Suddenly the Williams' automobile moved
backwards pinning Gupton between the two vehicles and seri-
ously injuring him. Pointing out that the policy of the plaintiff
must conform to the relevant state statutes concerning insurance
coverage, the court quoted a section of the South Carolina Code
which defines "insured" as including (among others) "any per-
son who uses [the described vehicle] . . . with the consent ...
of the named insured,'1 2 and another section which provides
that no insurer shall issue an automobile liability policy "unless
it contains a provision insuring the persons defined as insured
against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use"' 3 of the in-
sured vehicle and held that before Gupton could claim the
benefits of uninsured motorist coverage by the plaintiff on
the Williams' automobile, he had to come within the statutory
requirements showing that he was an insured and that the acci-
dent arose out of the use of Riggs' vehicle. No point was made
concerning the former as it was apparent from the facts that
Gupton was driving with Riggs' permission and was therefore
an insured. However, whether the accident arose out of the use
of the Riggs' truck gave the court more trouble. Relying on
Coletrai nv. Coletrain'4 among other cases, the court refused to
limit "use" to physical operations or driving and ruled that the
use here was the delivery of gasoline which was contemplated
by the parties when the insurance contract was created. The
court, therefore, denied the plaintiff's claim.
0. Ownership-Meaning As Used In Automobile Insurance
Coverage
A series of cases decided during the survey period concerned
insurance coverage based upon ownership as that term is used
12. S.C. CODY ANN. § 46-750.31(2) (Supp. 1965).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.32 (Supp. 1965).
14. 238 S.C. 555, 121 S.E.2d 89 (1961).
[Vol. 18
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in various policy provisions, the usual problem in the cases being
that record title was in one person but the argument was made
that true ownership was in another.
The first case of this series was Bankers Ins. Co. v. Griffin.15
In this case Merdy Griffin had as of May 31, 1963, a policy with
Bankers Insurance Company on a described automobile, and his
brother, Henry Griffin had as of the same date a policy with
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company on a described vehicle.
On May 31, 1963, Merdy Griffin attempted to buy from Mal-
cohn Carter Motor Company a 1960 Pontiac. His credit was not
good, so the salesman suggested that the car be bought in an-
other's name. Henry Griffin, whose credit was good, agreed to
sign the note and mortgage and as a result the automobile was
registered in Henry Griffin's name and the South Carolina
Highway Department issued a title certificate in his name.
Bankers Insurance Company, Merdy Griffin's insurer, issued
an endorsement covering this new car. On June 8, 1963, the
1960 Pontiac was involved in an accident. Bankers brought a
declaratory judgment action seeking among other things a dec-
laration that Nationwide was on the risk since the Nationwide
policy provided automatic coverage for newly acquired automo-
biles the "ownership" of which was acquired by the insured. The
court quoted the South Carolina Code1 which provides that "a
certificate of title issued by the [Highway] Department is
prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it," but concluded
that under the facts this presumption had been overcome, and,
since Henry Griffin had never acquired "ownership," the 1960
Pontiac was not covered by the Nationwide policy.
Hanna v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 0 .17 arose out of a
series of sales of a 1953 Ford. This automobile was owned by
Glennie S. Miller and was insured by State Farm. On Septem-
ber 9, 1961, Miller traded this car on a 1960 Plymouth to Man-
ning Conlin, an automobile dealer, endorsing the certificate of
title over to him in blank and delivering it and the registration
card to him. On September 18, 1961, Miller informed the de-
fendant State Farm of the change of cars, and State Farm
shortly thereafter issued a new policy identical to the policy on
the 1953 Ford except that the policy number was changed and
15. 244 S.C. 552, 137 S.E.2d 785 (1964).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150.11 (1962).
17. 233 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
1966]
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the description of the vehicle insured was changed from the
1953 Ford to the 1960 Plymouth. In the meanwhile on Septem-
ber 18, 1961, Manning Colin sold the 1953 Ford to Wade Con-
lin, another automobile dealer, delivering to him the certificate
of title still endorsed in blank and the registration card. On
September 19, 1961, Wade Conlin sold the car to "Pappy" Mar-
tin and delivered the certificate of title and registration card to
him. On September 30, 1961, Martin sold the car to Willie H.
McGee but did not deliver the certificate of title or registration
card to him because he, Martin, had not filled in the certificate.
After filling in the certificate of title before a notary, but before
delivery of the certificate and registration card to McGee, Mc-
Gee, while driving the 1953 Ford, was involved in an accident
with the automobiles of George McCrea, Jr. and Blanche D.
Hanna. Blanche had her automobile liability insurance with St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company. She was killed and
her husband, Norman Hanna, the driver of her automobile, was
injured. Her estate instituted suit against McCrea and McGee
as did her husband. St. Paul defended McGee as an uninsured
motorist. Mr. Hanna's case, with his administrator substituted
as plaintiff after his death, resulted in a verdict against McGee
only in the amount of 1,500 dollars actual damages and 10,000
dollars punitive damages. The suit by Mrs. Hanna's executors
was then settled, with McCrea's insurer and St. Paul each mak-
ing a contribution. St. Paul then instituted this suit in the name
of the estate of Mrs. Hanna, as subrogee of the payments made
to her under its uninsured motorist coverage, against State
Farm, asserting that State Farm had coverage on the McGee
vehicle. The administrator of Mr. Hanna then sued St. Paul
seeking to collect the punitive damages assessed against McGee
under the uninsured motorist endorsement of St. Paul's policy
on his wife's automobile. These cases were consolidated for trial.
Based upon Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co.18 the court held puni-
tive damages not recoverable under an uninsured motorist en-
dorsement. The claim was made that, since State Farm's policy
on Miller's 1953 Ford provided coverage for damages arising
out of the "ownership, maintenance, or use" of the described
automobile and the policy covered as an insured any person
operating with the permission of the named insured, and, that
18. 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964). Of course, by amendment now
codified as S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(4) (Supp. 1965), punitive damages are
recoverable under an uninsured motorist endorsement.
[Vol. 18
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Miller was still the "owner" because he had not complied with
the statutory provisions to effectuate a transfer of the certificate
of title, and, since McGee was driving with Miller's permis-
sion,19 State Farm was on the risk. The South Carolina
Code20 provides that an owner at the time of the sale of his
vehicle shall "execute an assignment and warranty of title to
transferee in the space provided therefor on the certificate
. . . and cause the certificate and assignment to be mailed or
delivered to the transferee or the Department." It is further
provided that (with the exception contained in another section)
"as between the parties, a transfer by an owner is not effective
until the provisions of this section have been complied with."
Miller admittedly did not comply with this section, but the court
relying upon Bankers Ins. Co. v. Griffi.21 held that "as between
the parties," Miller and Manning Conlin and Miller had trans-
ferred ownership, thus relieving State Farm of any liability.
The next in this series of cases was Travelers ILndem. Co. v.
Dees.22 James M. Foxsworth was the named insured in an auto-
mobile liability policy issued by Travelers covering certain de-
scribed automobiles as "owned" automobiles and providing lia-
bility coverage on non-owned automobiles, but only as "excess
insurance over any other valid and collectable insurance," and
with an exclusion from non-owned automobile coverage on the
non-owned automobile while it was being used in a business or
occupation of the insured, unless the non-owned automobile was
a private passenger automobile operated by the named insured
or certain other specified categories of persons. Samuel T.
Dees, a used car dealer, was insured under a garage liability
policy of South Carolina Insurance Company which covered all
cars "owned" by Dees and further covered "any person while
using, with permission of the named insured, an automobile to
which the insurance applies . . . provided such person's actual
operation.., is within the scope of such permission," but which
excluded from coverage as insured any person with respect to a
car, possession of which the named insured had transferred pur-
suant to a sales agreement. While both policies were in effect,
19. The facts do not indicate any theory of permission unless the theory was
that a permittee of a permittee of a permittee of a permittee of a permittee can
grant permission, i.e., permission came down the line from Miller to McGee.
20. S.C. CODE ANx. § 46-150.15 (1962).
21. 244 S.C. 552, 137 S.E.2d 785 (1964).
22. 235 F. Supp. 515 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
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Foxsworth showed an interest in a 1960 Lincoln on Dees' lot and
proposed trading his 1956 Cadillac for it. Dees made him a
"trade-in difference" offer which Foxsworth declined, but Foxs-
worth showed such interest in the Lincoln that Dees let him
take it over the weekend with the understanding that it would
be bought or returned on the next Monday. Dees wrote this
understanding on a bill of sale form, but no money passed be-
tween the parties and no price was agreed upon. While Fox-
sworth was using the car over the weekend on a trip to Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina, he was involved in an accident injuring
Eugene Covington and Katherine and Helen Crumpler, all of
whom instituted suits against Foxsworth. Travelers brought
this action joining as defendants Dees, the Crumplers, Coving-
ton, Foxsworth and the South Carolina Insurance Company,
seeking a declaratory judgment of the rights of the parties. The
court found that under Bankers Ins. Co. v. Criffin23 the failure
of Dees to comply with the title law was not determinitive of
ownership between the parties but that the facts showed there
had been no meeting of the minds on a contract of sale and there-
fore no change of ownership. Therefore, the exclusion of the
South Carolina Insurance Company contract on automobiles
transferred pursuant to sales agreement did not apply, and under
the terms of the omnibus clause of its policy, coverage was fur-
nished to Foxsworth as an insured, since he was driving an
"owned" automobile with the permission of Dees. The court
then determined that under its language covering non-owned
automobiles Travelers was on the risk and the exclusion under
such coverage was not applicable since the Lincoln was a private
passenger automobile operated by Foxsworth. Such coverage by
Travelers was, however, held to be under the terms of its contract
excess coverage.
Clouse v. American Nut. Liab. Ins. Co.24 was decided prior to
Hanna v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.2 5 and Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Dees)2 but it was appealed and the decision 27 was not
handed down until March 25, 1965, after Hanna and Dees had
been decided. On June 5, 1961, Prothro Chevrolet, Inc., owned
a 1956 Oldsmobile which it had previously sold to one Woodrow
23. 244 S.C. 552, 137 S.E.2d 785 (1964).
24. 232 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
25. 233 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
26. 235 F. Supp. 515 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
27. 344 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1965).
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Way but which it had repossessed under a conditional sales con-
tract. Prothro apparently had obtained the certificate of title
from Way but had never had a replacement certificate of title
issued showing it as owner. Freddie Mum wished to buy the
car and made a down payment and executed a conditional sales
contract for the balance. Prothro surrendered possession of the
car to him. The procedure for a sale such as took place is set
forth in the code:
If a dealer buys a vehicle and holds it for resale and pro-
cures the certificate of title from the owner within ten days
after delivery to him of the vehicle, he need not send the
certificate to the Department, but, upon transferring the
vehicle to another person other than by the creation of a
security interest, shall promptly execute the assignment and
warranty of title by a dealer, showing the names and ad-
dresses of the transferee and of any lienholder holding
security interest created or reserved at the time of the resale
and the date of his security agreement, in the spaces provid-
ed therefor on the certificate or as the Department pre-
scribes, and mail or deliver the certificate to the Depart-
ment with the transferee's application for a new certifi-
cate.2
8
Prothro executed and delivered an assignment and warranty of
title to Munn along with state highway department form 402,
a certificate of insurance form. Munn could not fill this out
since he had no liability insurance. Prothro gave Munn an
envelope addressed to the South Carolina Highway Department,
and Munn was to mail in the various papers upon completing
the 402 form. This he never did because two days later on June
7, 1961, Munn negligently collided with Lawrence Clouse. Clouse,
joined by his employers workmen's compensation carrier which
had paid him benefits, sued Munn and recovered a verdict. After
a nulla bona return on an execution against Munn, Clouse and
Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin,
the workmen's compensation carrier, instituted this suit against
American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, the insurer of
Prothro under a garage liability policy. The theory of the suit
was that, since Prothro failed to comply with the title transfer
provisions above quoted, Prothro was still the owner of the 1956
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150.16 (1962).
1966]
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Oldsmobile and coverage was available under the omnibus clause
of its garage liability policy which covered "any automobile
owned by or in charge of the named insured" and defined "in-
sured" as "any person while using an automobile covered by this
policy ... provided the actual use of the automobile ... [was]
. . . by the named insured or with its permission." Applying
Bankers Ins. Co. v. G6rifin20 the district court found for the
defendant, holding that Munn was the true owner of the 1956
Oldsmobile, which holding, of course, defeated coverage under
the defendant's policy. On appeal the court of appeals reversed
the decision. The basis for the reversal was stated:
In its laws governing motor vehicle registration and
licensing, South Carolina Code of Laws, title 46 (1962),
South Carolina has clearly spelled out a public policy that
motor vehicles are not to be operated upon its highways
without liability insurance coverage or its equivalents for
uninsured motorists. Administratively, the state refuses to
register or transfer title to or to license the operation of a
vehicle without proof of insurance or its statutory equiva-
lents. Sections 46-17(3) and 46-137. Failure to comply
with the statute is a misdemeanor. Section 46-11. We note
parenthetically that we are not concerned with the alterna-
tives to liability insurance in this case, sections 46-135
through 46-138.8, since it is conceded that neither Munn
nor Prothro complied or attempted to comply with them.
We turn then to the particular statutes involved in this
case. Two sections deal with how voluntary transfers are
carried out and when such transfers are effective. Section
46-150.15 provdies for those situations in which the trans-
ferror is the registered titleholder named in the certificate
issued by the State Highway Department covering the sub-
ject automobile. In effect the section provides that the seller
may either deliver the specified documents to his transferee
who must thereupon mail or deliver them to the Department
or the transferor may himself mail or deliver them to the
Department. It further provides that except as between the
parties, the transfer is not effective until the section has
been complied with.
The other section dealing with voluntary transfers, section
46-150.16 is the controlling provision in this case. It pro-
29. 244 S.C. 552, 137 S.E.2d 785 (1964).
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vides for those situations in which a registered dealer trans-
fers a car of which he is not the registered titleholder. This
section specifically provides that the transferor himself must
mail or deliver the specified documents to the Department.
Thus, in exchange for the privilege of holding the car in
his stock for resale without having it titled in his own name,
the responsibility is placed upon the dealer instead of the
purchaser to see that the old certificate, together with any
other necessary documents, is sent to the Department when
the car is resold. In view of the fact that these papers must
include a certification that the new applicant has liability
insurance coverage or its equivalents before the Department
will issue the new certificate of title, we are forced to the
conclusion that the distinction between sections 46-150.15
and 46-150.16 is of legal significance in the state's program
of insurance. It is an administrative device by which the
state seeks to assure itself of continued liability coverage on
a large number of secondhand cars sold throughout the
state. We think section 46-150.16, when considered in con-
junction with the other sections of the South Carolina Motor
Vehicle Registration and Licensing Act and particularly
section 46-150.15, indicates a legislative intent to hold the
transfer ineffectual, certainly to the extent necessary to hold
the insurance carrier liable under the circumstances of this
case, unless there is compliance with its terms by the dealer-
transferor. We think the failure of Prothro to comply with
the statute left him with a responsibility for the operation
of the car by Munn with his consent which is covered by
the omnibus clause of his liability insurance policy.30
It appears to the writer that the court of appeals is in error.
The finding of the court of appeals is that section 45-150.16
requires a dealer to send in to the highway department a cer-
tificate signed by the purchaser of a car to the effect that he
has "liability insurance or its equivalents," since without such
a certification the department will not issue a new certificate
of title to the purchaser. Section 46-150.16 does not provide
for such a certificate of insurance or equivalent; it requires that
the dealer mail to the department "the transferee's application
for a new certificate [of title]." The statutory provision 31 deal-
30. Clouse v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 344 F.2d 18, 19-20 (4th Cir.
1965).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150 (1962).
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ing with certificates of title and applications for such certifi-
cates contains no requirement that a vehicle have insurance or
its equivalent before a certificate of title be issued on it. (Ob-
viously one may wish title to a vehicle to prove ownership with-
out any intention of operating the vehicle, e.g., to display it
because of its historical interest, and therefore without any need
for liability insurance on it.) Therefore, in the provision re-
quiring the dealer to mail or deliver to the department the
transferee's application for a new certificate of title, an appli-
cation that does not require a showing of liability insurance or
its equivalent, is not "of legal significance in the state's program
of insurance." The court of appeals apparently fell into error by
a misinterpretation of sections 46-17(3) and 46-137 of the
South Carolina Code which the court quotes for the proposition
that South Carolina will not transfer title to a vehicle without
proof of insurance or its equivalents. Registration and licensing
is required by section 46-11 of the South Carolina Code in order
for a vehicle to be "driven, operated or moved upon a high-
way .... " Section 47-17 (3) states generally what an application
for registering and licensing shall contain and section 46-137
provides that every person applying for registration for a
vehicle who declares that the vehicle is insured must furnish a
certificate to that effect. These sections do not apply to certifi-
cates of title, only to registration and licensing. Section 46-14.1
merely makes with exceptions not applicable here a certificate
of title a prerequisite to registering a vehicle.
D. Uninsured Motorist Coverage
The great number of cases decided during the survey period
concerning uninsured motorist coverage reflect the confusion
which still exists in this relatively new field, a confusion com-
plicated by the 1963 amendments to the Uninsured Motorist
Act.32 These amendments, which became effective on June 14,
1963, changed the act in many basic particulars, so that several
of the cases reviewed here which arose prior to the effective date
of the amendments reached conclusions different from conclu-
sions which would now be reached as a result of the amendments.
Several of the cases which arose under uninsured endorsements
32. For an excellent brief resume of the legislative history and purpose of
this act, see Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., v. Fulton, 244 S.C. 559, 137 S.E.2d
769 (1964).
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are reviewed under other subtitles herein for reasons obvious to
one reading other sections of ihis review.
In North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson3 the question was whether
a defendant in a tort suit insured by an insurer which subse-
quent to the accident which gave rise to the suit went into re-
ceivership was an uninsured motorist within the meaning of the
act which at that time, prior to the 1963 Amendments, defined
an "uninsured motor vehicle" as "a motor vehicle as to which
there is no bodily injury liability insurance and property dam-
age liability insurance .. .or there is such insurance, but the
insurance company writing it denies coverage thereunder."
3 4
The South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the insolvency
of the insurer as a denial of coverage and held that the "insured"
of the insolvent insurer was an uninsured motorist, so that the
plaintiff's insurer was liable on its uninsured motorist coverage.
The court followed, in reaching this conclusion, State Farm u t.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower,35 a Virginia case, in which the Vir-
ginia court stated that a person in distress is denied help when
one who hears his cries says nothing but walks away. The argu-
ment was made that section 46-750.31.3, the codification of a
part of the 1963 amendments which became effective after this
case arose, but before it reached the South Carolina Supreme
Court, which amended the definition of "uninsured motor
vehicle" to include the situation "where there was such insur-
ance, but the insurance carrier who wrote the same is declared
insolvent" amounted to a legislative declaration that the act
prior to such amendment provided no such protection. The
court acknowledged the principle that an amendment could be
considered in a proper situation as an aid in arriving at the
legislative intent of the statute amended, but pointed out that
this principle was merely a rule of construction where ambiguity
existed and there was no ambiguity here. The court pointed out
that the amendment under consideration was a part of a general
amendment, so that the argument of legislative intent did not
carry the same weight as if the amendment had been an isolated
independent amendment.3 6 It is interesting to note that on
August 2, 1963, almost a year prior to the North River case, the
33. 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964).
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.11(3) (1962).
35. 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
36. Compare this argument with the argument contained in Vernon v. Har-
leysville Mut. Cas. Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841 (1964).
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United States District Court, Eastern District of South Carolina
in FederaZ Ins. Co. v. Speight37 under the same factual situation
reached the opposite result, holding that an insured whose in-
surer becomes insolvent after the accident date was not an unin-
sured motorist. The district court concluded that the enactment
of the amendment showed a previous legislative intent not to
include as an uninsured motorist one whose insurer had subse-
quently become insolvent, a situation corrected by the amend-
ment. Both courts in dealing with the problem of interpreting
legislative intent relied upon 50 American Jurisprudence,
Statutes, Section 275, p. 261, but reached different conclusions.38
Hatecett v. Nationwide Nut. Ins. Co.39 is of little interest in
that the question there raised cannot arise under the uninsured
motorist law in the future as a result of the 1963 amendments.
The accident which gave rise to the suit occurred on May 4,
1962, when the plaintiff's automobile, insured by the defendant
insurer under a policy containing an endorsement to cover dam-
ages to the insured caused by an uninsured motorist, was in-
volved in an accident with one Kenneth Stone, an uninsured
motorist. At that time the Uninsured Motorist Act contained
no provisions requiring any notice by an insured that he was
proceeding against an uninsured motorist,40 the law merely pro-
viding that no policy should be issued unless it contained an
endorsement protecting the insured, as defined in the act, against
accidents caused by an uninsured motorist in the amounts of the
statutory limit. Section 46-750.18 of the Code41 reads "nor
may anything be required of the insured except the establish-
ment of legal liability .. .. " To protect itself the defendant
by its endorsement required the insured to make a report of the
accident and at the time of instituting suit to mail a copy of the
summons and complaint in the action taken by the insured
against the uninsured motorist to it. The plaintiff on August 8,
1962, instituted suit against the uninsured motorist. For the
first time, on September 24, 1962, the plaintiff notified the
37. 220 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.S.C. 1963).
38. It would appear arguable that to make an insurer pay the liability claim
of its insured against an "uninsured" motorist who has not paid anything into
the uninsured motorist fund out of which the insurer is reimbursed for payments
to its insured amounts to depriving the insurer of property without due process
or a taking without just compensation.
39. 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608 (1964).
40. This has been corrected by S.C. CODE AxN. § 46-750.33 (Supp. 1965),
such section being a codification of a part of the 1963 amendments.
41. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-750.18 (1962).
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defendant insurer of the pending action and mailed a copy of the
summons and complaint to the insurer, indicating that while
Stone was in default, the plaintiff would not object if the de-
fendant wished to intervene in its own name. The plaintiff
refused to waive the default and allow the defendant to file an
answer on behalf of Stone. Under these circumstances the de-
fendant refused to take any action, and the plaintiff proceeded
to obtain a default judgment and a nulla bona return against
Stone. The plaintiff then instituted this action for the amount
of the judgment. The defendant denied liability on the grounds
that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the conditions of
the uninsured motorist endorsement by failing to give the re-
quired notice. The plaintiff's position which was adopted by
the trial judge was that the endorsement written as protection
against uninsured motorists could require no more of the insured
than the Uninsured Motorist Act, that is, the requirement of the
establishment of legal liability alone. On appeal the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that the statute providing that the
insured could be required to do nothing more than establish
legal liability, placed upon the insurer the burden of devising
a means whereby it could appear and defend a tort action
against an uninsured motorist, so that the defendant by inserting
the notice provisions merely provided for a means whereby it
could prior to default appear and defend, and such provisions
were permissible, since they were not in conflict with the act.42
Vernon v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co.,43 like the case pre-
viously reviewed is of little interest now since it arose under
the Uninsured Motorist Act prior to the 1963 amendments.
Under then section 46-750.14 of the Code44 the prescribed unin-
sured motorist endorsement required the insurer to pay to the
insured "all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover
as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle," not exceeding the specified amounts and minus a 200
dollars deductible amount for property damage. On the day of
the accident in question, July 11, 1962, Thomas D. Johnson had
in effect with American Security Insurance Company an insur-
ance policy covering an automobile owned by him, which pro-
vided fifty dollars deductible collision coverage to the described
42. Apparently the defendant raised no question of due process.
43. 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841 (1964).
44. S.C. CoDE ANx. § 46-750.14 (1962).
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vehicle and also any non-owned automobile, subject to reserva-
tions, while being driven by him. On that day Charles Vernon,
a used car dealer, had in effect a liability insurance policy to
which an uninsured motorist endorsement was attached under
which his insurer, Harleysville Mutual, undertook to pay dam-
ages to which the insured might be entitled as a result of injury
to an insured automobile owned by the named insured caused
by an uninsured motorist subject to a 200 dollars deductible pro-
vision. The endorsement further provided that the protection
under such endorsement would be excess over any other valid
and collectible insurance against such property damage. John-
son went to Vernon and took out for a trial run a 1960 Plymouth
automobile owned by Vernon with a view toward purchasing it.
While operating this automobile, Johnson was involved in an
accident with one Morgan, an uninsured motorist, as a result of
which the 1960 Plymouth was severely damaged. Vernon sued
Johnson and Morgan but recovered a judgment against Morgan
only for 1,543.00 dollars actual damages. Vernon then instituted
this action against Harleysville and American seeking a declara-
tory judgment determining which of the two insurers was pri-
marily responsible for paying his judgment. It was the position
of Harleysville that its policy was excess over "any other valid
and collectible insurance against such property damage" as pro-
vided in its policy and that the coverage afforded by American
with its collision policy was "other valid and collectible insur-
ance against such property damage." American relied upon a
provision of its policy that where a collision was to a non-owned
automobile the coverage provided by its policy "shall be excess
insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance" avail-
able "against a loss covered by this policy." The trial court held
American primarily liable less its fifty dollars deductible. On
appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial
court and held that the Uninsured Motorist Act at the time of
the occurrence of the accident allowed no exclusion where there
was other insurance available. Since no exclusion was contained
in the statutes, Harleysville could not exclude from its coverage
property damage covered by other insurance. The court pointed
out that the act by the amendments effective June 14, 1963,
allows such exclusion, and construed the amendments as being
"a tacit declaration by the legislature that such damage could
19
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not be excluded under the previous Act."45 The court further
held that American could not be liable since the provision of its
collision policy outlined above was applicable only when an in-
sured had another policy covering "a loss covered by this policy"
and other such insurance was not present, since there were not
two or more insurance policies covering the same interests, the
same subject matter and against the same risk, i.e. there was not
double collision coverage.
46
Johnsonv . Allstate Ins. Co.47 arose out of a dispute between
Allstate Insurance Company and Southern Farm Bureau Cas-
ualty Insurance Company as to which of the insurers was liable
as a result of an accident in which plaintiff's intestate, a pas-
senger in an automobile insured by Allstate, was killed due to
the negligence of two truck drivers, driving trucks owned by one
Livingston, who was insured on these trucks by Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Company. Previous to this action
suit had been brought on behalf of the estate of the plaintiff's
intestate against the drivers of the two trucks owned by Living-
ston and against Livingston. In this wrongful death action a
judgment was obtained on behalf of the plaintiff's intestate
against the truck drivers and Livingston. On a previous ap-
peal,48 however, the court of appeals held that the drivers of
the trucks were not using them with Livingston's permission or
as his agents and servants, so that the judgment in the tort
action was reserved as to Livingston, leaving the plaintiff's in-
testate with a judgement against the truck drivers who were un-
insured motorists. The plaintiff's intestate instituted this action
by joining both insurers, since Allstate under its uninsured
motorist endorsement appeared liable to the plaintiff's intestate
to the extent of 10,000 dollars. Allstate, however, sought to
compel Southern Farm to pick up its 10,000 dollar tab on
the theory that Southern Farm, even though it defended the
45. Compare the argument of the court in this case to the effect that the
amendmennt was a "Tacit declaration" that the law was not different before the
amendment, with the argument of the court in the North Bridge case, considered
above.
46. It is difficult to understand why American, which agreed "To pay for
loss by collision to the owned or to a non-owned automobile" unless there was
like coverage for the loss by another insurer (which the court held there was
not), was not required to pay Vernon the two-hundred dollars deductible
allowable under the uninsured motorist endorsement less its fifty dollars de-
ductible.
47. 333 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1964).
48. 315 F.2d 429 (4th Cir 1963).
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tort action under a reservation of rights, had waived its rights to
deny coverage and was estopped to deny coverage, since it had
proceeded to defend the tort action and had, with Allstate, con-
tributed to the settlement of a companion case. The district
court held that these facts standing alone showed no waiver or
estoppel. By this per curiam decision the court of appeals agreed
and affirmed the decision of the district court.
In Davidson v. Eastern Fire c Cas. Ins. Co.4 9 the plaintiff
sought recovery under an uninsured motorist endorsement at-
tached by the defendant to the policy of one Bobby Dority.
Dority was not driving the vehicle insured under Eastern's
policy at the time of the collision, but rather was driving with
permission the uninsured automobile of James Brabham when it
was involved in an accident with the uninsured vehicle of Adam
Stuckey. The plaintiff, a passenger in the vehicle driven by
Dority, caught in the position of no apparent insurance coverage
obtained a judgement against Stuckey and sought in this action
to hold the defendant insurer liable. The lower court held the
defendant liable, but on appeal the South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the case, pointing out that the South Carolina
Code0 0 defined "insured" as used in section 46-750.14, the section
requiring the uninsured motorist endorsement, as,
the named insured and, while resident of the same house-
hold, the spouse of any such named insured and rela-
tives of either, while in a motor vehicle or otherwise, and
any person who uses, with the consent, expressed or implied,
of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which the policy
applies and a guest in such motor vehicle to which the policy
applies or the personal representative of any of the
above .... 5
And, since the uninsured motorist coverage for a guest, as the
plaintiff admittedly was, is limited to the situation where the
motor vehicle designated in the policy was in use, there was no
coverage available under the endorsement. The court summarily
rejected the plaintiff's assertion that paragraph five of the
defendant's policy extending benefits of liability coverage to
use of other automobiles extended to the uninsured motorist
coverage, stating:
49. 245 S.C. 472, 141 S.E.2d 135 (1965).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.11 (1962).
51. Ibid.
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The issue here is not whether the respondent is entitled to
the benefit of the liability coverage of Dority's policy, but
whether she is entitled, as an "insured" within the meaning
of Section 46-750.11, to the benefit of the uninsured motorist
coverage required of Eastern by Section 46-750.14.52
Pulliam v. Do61 was another of those cases which involved
the problems caused by 1963 amendments. On June 2, 1963,
Government Employees Insurance Company issued to the plain-
tiff its policy containing an uninsured motorist endorsement
written to comply with the applicable section at that time which
required uninsured motorist protection for accidents caused by
unknown drivers, whether or not the injury to the plaintiff
occurred through an impact between the vehicles involved. On
June 13, 1963, the 1963 amendments became effective under
which the uninsured motorist protection required to be given by
statute was reduced by a provision" to the effect that one
insured under such an endorsement could not sue and recover
damages from an unknown motorist unless there was a physical
contact with the vehicle of such unknown motorist. On Septem-
ber 28, 1963, plaintiff was injured as a result of a no-contact
accident with an unknown motorist and brought suit. The in-
surer demurred asserting that the complaint alleged no physical
contact and under the amended statute such was required. The
lower court sustained the demurrer, but the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the amended statute could not affect
a contract right which accrued prior to the amendment, the
endorsement as previously written being a vested contract right.
E. Certified and Voluntary Automobile Policies
Several cases decided during the survey period reflect that
confusion still exists concerning the distinction between "certi-
fied" and "voluntary" automobile liability policies. Our Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act" as passed in 1952 is of the
"one bite" variety, i.e., it contains no requirement that one have
automobile liability insurance until after he has been involved
in an accident while uninsured and without a statutory substi-
52. Davidson v. Eastern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 245 S.C. 472, 478, 141 S.E.2d
135, 138 (1965).
53. 246 S.C. 106, 142 S.E.2d 861 (1965).
54. This provision is now codified as S.C. CODE AN. § 46-750.34 (Supp.
1965).
55. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1952, p. 1853.
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tute for insurance. After such an accident, however, one is re-
quired to have a "motor vehicle liability policy," a policy certi-
fied by the insurer to meet the "future proof" provisions of the
act. Such a policy must meet various requirements not required
in a voluntary policy.56 In a series of cases57 decided prior to
the Uninsured Motorist Act of 195958 which amended the Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, the elucidating light of liti-
gation had made these distinctions clear, but the 1959 amend-
ments have restored confusion.
In American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Delitte0 the question arose
whether a household exclusion in American Liberty's policy vol-
untarily issued to S. D. DeWitte by American Liberty was valid.
One Bobby DeWitte was injured allegedly through the negli-
gence of his father, the insured, in the maintenance or use 0 of
the insured automobile and instituted suit against his father.
American Liberty then instituted this suit seeking a determina-
tion that it was not on the risk in view of an exclusion in its
policy which excluded from the benefits of the liability provi-
sion the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of the insured. The
insured and his son took the position that, while prior to the
1959 amendments an insurer could contract as he pleased respect-
ing coverage, the 1959 amendments 1 destroyed the distinctions
56. These requirements are now set forth in S.C. COD ANN. § 46-702(7)
(Supp. 1965).
57. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 233 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1956);
Barkley v. International Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 38, 86 S.E.2d 603 (1955).
58. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1959, p. 585.
59. 236 F. Supp. 636 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
60. The facts given in the opinion merely indicate that the son was injured
as the result of a fire which occurred while he was looking under the car's
hood.
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.13 (1962) (since amended) read as follows:
No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance or of property
damage liability insurance covering liability arising from the ownership,
maintenance or use of any motor vehicle shall be issued or delivered in
this State to the owner of such vehicle, or shall be issued or delivered by
any insurer licensed in this State upon any motor vehicle then principally
garaged or principally used in this State, unless it contains a provision
insuring the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using
any of those motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of the
named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages
arising out of the owriership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicles
within the United States or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits ex-
clusive of interest and costs, with respect to each motor vehicle, as follows:
Ten thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in
any one accident, and, subject to such limit for one person, twenty thous-
and dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons
in any one accident and five thousand dollars because of injury to or de-
struction of property of others in any one accident.
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previously existing between voluntary and certified policies.
The defendants claimed in effect that section 46-750.13 created
a statutory omnibus clause (which gave the father, the insured,
protection by its terms) out of which the insurer could not con-
tract by adding the exclusion for household members. The court
rejected this argument and held that section 46-750.13 applied
only to a "motor vehicle liability policy," i.e., a certified policy
filed to satisfy the future proof provisions of the act, not to a
voluntary policy such as American wrote. It therefore held
there was no coverage for the son, he being validly excluded.
Sections 46-750.13 and 462750.14 appear in Article 5 of the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility, Act, subtitled "Motor Ve-
hicle Liability Policies." Since a motor vehicle liability policy
is defined by section 46-402 as one certified as future proof, it
would appear at first glance that sections 46-750.13 and 46-750.14
must relate to "motor vehicle liability policies," i.e., certified
policies, and the court construing section 46-750.13 so held in the
De-Witte case.
However, in Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co. v. Fulton62 the
South Carolina Supreme Court construing section 46-750.14 held
that this section applied to policies voluntarily issued. Since
section 46-750.14 incorporates by reference section 46-750.13 it is
difficult to reconcile the decisions. In the Fulton case the plain-
tiff insurer brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment
to the effect that the uninsured motorist endorsement attached
to its policy issued to Melvin Fulton did not afford coverage to
the wife of the named insured, Mrs. Maggie Fulton, who was
killed on January 26, 1963, while riding as a passenger in the
automobile of an uninsured motorist. The endorsement defined
the word "insured" so as to exclude from its coverage Mrs. Ful-
ton, the wife of the named insured. However, the administrator
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-750.14 (1962) (since amended) read as follows:
Nor shall any such policy or contract be so issued or delivered as de-
scribed in § 46-750.13 unless it contains an endorsement or provisions
undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled
to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle, within limits which shall be no less than the requirements of § 46-
750.13. Such endorsement or provisions shall also provide for no less than
five thousand dollars coverage for injury to or destruction of the property
of the insured in any one accident, but may provide an exclusion of the
first two hundred dollars of such loss or damage. No additional charge
shall be made to the policyholder for such endorsement. Recovery under
the endorsement or provisions shall be subject to the conditions set forth
in §§ 46-750.15 to -750.18.
62. 244 S.C. 559, 137 S.E.2d 769 (1964).
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of Mrs. Fulton's estate, the defendant, took the position that the
Uninsured Motorist Act required Southern Farm to include as
an "insured" Mrs. Fulton. Section 46-750.14 provided that any
automobile liability insurance policy issued must contain an
endorsement undertaking to pay "the insured" all damages
within specified limits which he should be entitled to recover as
damages from an uninsured motorist, and section 46-750.11 de-
fined "insured" as including "while resident of the same house-
hold the spouse of any such named insured." It was admitted
that Mrs. Fulton was the spouse of the named insured and a
resident of the household, and so within the apparent coverage
of the Uninsured Motorist Act. However, the insurer took the
position that these statutory omnibus provisions under the Unin-
sured Motorist Act applied only to a policy certified as proof
of financial responsibility for the future under the Code,63 and,
since the policy was not so certified, it could contract with its
insured free of the compulsion imposed by the code sections
above mentioned. The court rejected this argument and found
a legislative intent to make all policies, including those volun-
tarily obtained, carry involuntarily an uninsured motorist pro-
vision complying with all of the provisions of the Uninsured
Motorist Act. The court held that the statutory requirements
were to be read into the uninsured motorist endorsement just as
though they had been printed in the endorsement.
It is believed that the legislature intended by the Uninsured
Motorist Act to recognize two terms of art, a "motor vehicle
liability insurance policy," i.e., a certified policy, and a "bodily
injury or property damage liability policy," i.e., voluntary pol-
icy. This appears to be recognized by section 46-702 which
defines an "insured motor vehicle" as one on which there is bod-
ily injury liability insurance and property damage liability in-
surance in the specified amounts, not as one on which there is a
"motor vehicle liability policy." 64
In Toole v. Nationwide Hut. Ins. Co.,65 the voluntary versus
certified policy problem came up in connection with a cancella-
tion. The plaintiff had obtained a judgment against one James
Rogers, but Nationwide, the insurer of Rogers, claimed it had
cancelled its policy prior to the date of the accident. The insurer
63. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-747 to -748 (1962).
64. This surveyor takes caveat as to the effect of the 1963 amendments to
sections 46-750.13 and 46-750.14 on the theories here advanced.
65. 238 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
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had not complied with the code 0 provisions concerning how a
certified policy could be cancelled. However, the policy in-
volved was a voluntary one and the court held these code pro-
visions did not apply. The argument was then made that section
46-138 which applies to voluntary policies had not been complied
with. This section read:
Upon the termination of insurance by cancellation or failure
to renew, notice of such cancellation or other termination
shall be filed by the insurer with the Department not later
than five days following the effective date of such cancella-
tion or other termination.67
The court ruled that the effectiveness of the cancellation did not
depend upon notice to the state highway department, since the
statute on its face recognized that there could be a cancellation
prior to notice being given the state highway department. The
purpose of such notice is to alert the department to revoke the
certificate of registration and license plates unless the owner
gives evidence of other insurance or contributes to the uninsured
motorist fund.
F. Miscellaneous Automobile Insurance Cases
In Myers v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.68 it was held that damage
to a car caused by rising tide was within the coverage afforded
by the defendant's policy language covering loss "caused by
flood or rising waters." Carroway v. Johnson"0 merely laid to
rest any doubts which Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co.70 may have
raised concerning the liability of automobile insurers for puni-
tive damages assessed against their insureds, holding that the
obligation of the insurer to pay "all sums" includes within the
word "sums" punitive damages.
Lewis v. Continental Ins. Co.71 held that the plaintiff who had
obtained a judgment in an in rem proceeding against a vehicle
owned by one Hollie Robinson, who was insured by the defend-
ant, was not entitled to recover in this proceeding brought in an
66. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.5, 46-750.26 (1962).
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-138 (1962).
68. 246 S.C. 46, 142 S.E.2d 704 (1965).
69. 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
70. 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
71. 239 F. Supp. 42 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
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attempt to collect on such in rem judgment. The court reasoned
that the policy imposed on the defendant the duty to pay only
such sums as the insured was "legally obligated to pay" and the
insured was under no legal obligation to pay the in rem judg-
ment, and for the further reason that another policy provision
made it a condition precedent to a suit against the insurer that
"the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been
finally determined either by judgment ... or by written agree-
ment of the insured, the claimant, and the company," and no
such judgment against the insured or agreement existed.
Lyles v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 00.72 arose under the "duty to
defend" clause of the defendant's policy which it had issued to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff, while driving a vehicle other than
the insured vehicle, was involved in an accident with one Kibler.
Kibler sued the plaintiff, and the plaintiff looked to defendant
for protection and defense, both of which defendant denied on
the grounds that its policy afforded no coverage. The plaintiff
obtained his own attorney to defend Kibler's action. Kibler
obtained a judgment against the plaintiff here, and the plaintiff
then brought this action seeking to recover from the defendant
attorney's fees he had paid his attorney for defending the suit
brought by Kibler. The question of whether the defendant
afforded coverage for the judgment against the plaintiff was
not in issue, but the trial judge held that the language of the
policy wherein the defendant undertook to defend the plaintiff
against any suit against a person entitled to protection alleging
bodily injury or property damage liability even if such suit
was groundless, imposed upon the defendant the duty to defend
the action regardless of whether coverage existed. On appeal the
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding
that such a defense clause imposes no obligation on an insurer
when the claim upon which the action was based is found to be
not within the coverage afforded.
Beasley v. Allstate Ins. 00.73 involved an interpretation of a
simple omnibus clause under a non-owner's automobile liability
policy. The omnibus clause on the policy issued by the defendant
to one Dannell Tolson was as follows:
With respect to the insurance for Bodily Injury Liability
and for Property Damage Liability the unqualified word
72. 245 S.C. 438, 141 S.E.2d 106 (1965).
73. 246 S.C. 153, 142 S.E.2d 872 (1965).
[Vol. 18
27
Kemmerlin: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
INSRANcE SURVEYED
'insured' includes (a) such named insured and spouse and
(b) any other person or organization legally responsible for
the use by such named insured or spouse of an automobile
not owned or hired by such other person or organization.
4
Tolson, the insured, was killed through the negligence of one
Wilkes who was driving Tolson's father car with Tolson as a
guest passenger. Tolson's administrator, the plaintiff, after ob-
taining a judgment against Wilkes, brought this action to re-
cover on the judgment, seeking to force Wilkes into the defini-
tion of an insured under the above omnibus clause. There was
no evidence in the record of the use being made of the car or the
circumstances surrounding the use, so the court was forced to
conclude that while Wilkes was "legally responsible" himself,
he was not "legally responsible for the use by such named insured
[Tolson] or spouse," so there was no coverage. The court by
dicta indicated that had Wilkes been Tolson's agent, he would
have been "legally responsible for the use by such named in-
sured" and coverage would have been available.
In Sheffield v. American Indem. Co.75 one Herman Boyd
Shealy, an uninsured motorist, negligently struck a car owned
by the plaintiff Shelly Sheffield, driven by Gloria Sheffield, the
wife of Shelly Sheffield. Gloria Sheffield and Shelly Sheffield
instituted suits against Shealy, Mrs. Sheffield's suit being for
personal injuries and Mr. Sheffield's suit being only for loss of
consortium of his wife, Gloria, and for her medical expenses,
since he was not a passenger in the car at the time. The defend-
ant, the automobile liability insurer of Shelly Sheffield, an-
swered in both cases for the uninsured motorist, and actively
participated in the defense of the Gloria Sheffield case, the first
of the two cases to be tried, which resulted in a verdict of 30,000
dollars actual and 500 dollars punitive damages for Gloria Shef-
field. The defendant paid Gloria Sheffield 10,000 dollars, the
limits for one person, and took no steps to defend the case of
Shelly Sheffield when it later came to trial. Shelly Sheffield
obtained a judgment of 15,000 dollars against Shealy, the unin-
sured motorist. The judgment being uncollectable, Shelly Shef-
field instituted this suit against American Indemnity under the
uninsured motorist endorsement attached to his policy. The
plaintiff's theory was that the endorsement which followed the
74. Id. at 156, 142 S.E.2d at 873.
75. 245 S.C. 389, 140 S.E.2d 787 (1965).
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terms of the statute70 in providing limits for "bodily injury
$10,000.00 each person; $20,000 each accident" entitled him to
10,000 dollars of the 15,000 dollars judgment he had obtained in
addition to the 10,000 dollars his -wife had been paid, i.e., that
there were two bodily injuries. The uninsured motorist endorse-
ment on the policy in question included Mr. Sheffield as an
insured by defining "insured" as "any person, with respect
to damages he is entitled to recover for care or loss of services
because of bodily injury to which this endorsement applies."
The endorsement further provided that "the insurance applies
separately with respect to each insured under this endorsement,
but neither this provision nor application of this insurance to
more than one insured shall operate to increase the limits of the
company's liability." The endorsement also contained the fol-
lowing:
The limit of bodily injury liability stated in the schedule
as applicable to 'each person' is the limit of the company's
liability for all damages, including damages for care or loss
of services because of bodily injury sustained by one person
as the result of any one accident and, subject to the above
provision respecting each person, the limit of such liability
stated in the schedule as applicable to 'each accident' is the
total limit of the company's liability for all damages, in-
cluding damages for care or loss of services, because of
bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the result
of any one accident.
77
The lower court ruled against the plaintiff and he appealed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed numerous cases
applying similar policy provisions and concluded that the con-
sequential damages of the plaintiff flowed from the same "bodily
injury" sustained by the wife and that there was only 10,000
dollars available for one bodily injury, which amount the wife
had already received, so her husband, the plaintiff, was entitled
to nothing.7 8 The court distinguished Sossman v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 79 in which the phrase construed was "personal
76. S.C. CODE Axx. § 46-750.14 (1962).
77. Sheffield v. American Indem. Co., 245 S.C. 389, 393, 140 S.E.2d 787, 789
(1965).
78. Of course, had the wife received less than ten thousand dollars, the plain-
tiff would have been entitled to the difference between what she had received
and ten thousand dollars.
79. 243 S.C. 552, 135 S.E.2d 87 (1964).
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injuries," the court having held there that a husband suffered
one personal injury in the loss of consortium and his wife suf-
fered another when she was negligently injured.
Three other cases"° touching upon the field of automobile in-
surance were decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court dur-
ing the survey period, but they are not reviewed here, since they
are of little interest from an insurance standpoint.
G. Double Insurance-Proration Under Fire Policy
Two cases dealing with fire insurance decided during the sur-
vey period are of interest in showing a trend toward a division
of thought in the court regarding the interpretation of the code
section which provides:
No company writing fire insurance policies, doing business
in this State, shall issue a policy for more than the value
stated in the policy or the value of the property to be insured,
the amount of insurance to be fixed by the insurer and in-
sured at or before the time of issuing the policy. In case of
total loss by fire the insured shall be entitled to recover the
full amount of insurance, and in case of a partial loss the
insured shall be entitled to recover the actual amount of the
loss, but in no event more than the amount of the insurance
stated in the contract. But if two or more policies are written
upon the same property, they shall be deemed and held to
to be contributive insurance, and if the aggregate sum of
all such insurance exceeds the insurable value of the prop-
erty, as agreed by the insurer and the insured, each company
shall, in the event of a total or partial loss, be liable for its
prorata share of insurance. Nothing in this section shall be
held to apply to insurance on chattels or personal property.8'
Thomas v. Penn Hut. Fire Ins. Co.82 was the first of these
cases. In 1959 George W. Thomas, J. Lever Chambers and Lula
Viola Chambers entered into a contract called a "Bond for Title"
under the terms of which Thomas agreed to convey a dwelling
house to the Chambers upon the payment to him of a certain sum
in monthly installments. The Chambers moved into the dwelling
house under this contract and lived there until it burned on Feb-
80. Teasly v. Lowe, 245 S.C. 271, 140 S.E.2d 171 (1965) ; Cooper v. Georgia
Cas. Co., 244 S.C. 286, 135 S.E.2d 774 (1964) ; Smith v. Ramsey, 244 S.C. 168,
135 S.E.2d 849 (1964).
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-154 (1962).
82. 244 S.C. 581, 137 S.E2d 856 (1964).
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ruary 23, 1962. Whether the relationship between Thomas and
Chambers was characterized as vendor-vendee or mortgagee-
mortgagor, it was undisputed that each had an insurable inter-
est in the dwelling house. On January 16, 1962, the Chambers
took out a policy on the house, evaluated in the policy at 4,000
dollars, with Atlantic Casualty and Fire Insurance Company
(hereinafter referred to as Atlantic). This policy named the
Chambers as insured, but undertook to protect Thomas as mort-
gagee "as interest may appear." On January 20, 1962, Thomas
took out a policy on the same house evaluated in the policy at
5,000 dollars with appellant Penn Mutual Fire Insurance Com-
pany (hereinafter referred to as Penn). This policy named
James Lever Chambers or George W. Thomas as insured "as
their interest may appear." Thus both policies undertook to in-
sure the Thomas and Chambers' interests in essentially the same
words "as interest may appear." Upon the burning of the house,
Atlantic and Penn took the position that both policies insured
the same interests, and, therefore, they were entitled to prorate
the loss on a contributive basis under the provisions of section
37-154, above set forth. In cases consolidated for trial Thomas
sued Penn for 5,000 dollars, the evaluation on the Penn policy
and the Chambers sued Atlantic for 4,000 dollars, the evaluation
on the Atlantic policy. Judgments were obtained in these
amounts, the master to whom these cases had been referred, even
though they were law cases, and the county court concurring in
finding as a fact that Thomas had intended to cover only his
interest, and the Chambers had intended to cover only their
interest. On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court pointed
out that both Thomas and the Chambers had separate insurable
interests, and that while section 37-154 provided for contribution
when two or more policies are "written upon the same property,"
such section should be read construing "property" as "interest,"
and here Thomas had insured one interest, his own, and the
Chambers had insured another, their own, so that they were
entitled to recover for their respective interests from their re-
spective insurers without proration. ir. Justice Brailsford in
a separate opinion concurred only because he felt bound by the
concurrent finding of the master and the county court that it
was "intended" by Thomas and the Chambers to insure separate
interests. He pointed out that, if he were free to interpret the
policies, his conclusion would be different, but in view of the
fact that the record on appeal contained no testimony, he could
not go behind the findings below.
Vol. 18
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In Johnson v. Fidelity c Guar. Ins. Co.,83 essentially the
same question presented in the Thomas case84 was before the
court. In September of 1960, Johnson, the plaintiff, bought a
shell home from Shell Homes, Inc. on an installment contract
basis, giving Shell Homes, Inc. a note and a mortgage on the
home for 3,270 dollars. On October 3, 1960, Shell Homes, Inc.
secured a policy, the price of which was included in Johnson's
payments, from Atlantic Casualty and Fire Company in the
amount of 3,500 dollars, naming Johnson as insured with a loss
payable clause to Shell Homes, Inc., such clause presumably
reading "as interest may appear." Johnson, after spending sev-
eral thousand dollars in completing the house including 500
dollars borrowed from Anderson Brothers Bank, on October 4,
1961, obtained a policy with the defendant insurer in the amount
of 4,000 dollars naming himself as insured with a loss payable
clause to the bank, such clause presumably reading "as interest
may appear." On December 26, 1961, the home was completely
destroyed by fire. The defendant insurer refused payment, and
the plaintiff instituted this action. The trial judge, after hearing
the testimony, ruled that the case presented only an issue of law
and dismissed the jury. He then ruled for the plaintiff, holding
that Johnson insured only his interest, and Shell Homes, Inc.
had insured only its interest, so that the defendant insurer was
liable for 4,000 dollars, not a pro rata share. On appeal the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court on the same
theory advanced by it in upholding the Thomas case. Mr. Justice
Brailsford dissented on the same grounds he had used for his
reservations in the Thomas case. He pointed out that here, unlike
the situation in Thomas, there was no testimony justifying the
finding of the trial court that Johnson and Shell Homes, Inc.
intended only to cover their respective interests, but rather the
policies spoke for themselves and showed that Johnson was the
insured under both policies and had the same interest under both
policies. He further pointed out that under the theory of the
majority opinion holding that Johnson had no interest in the
policy obtained by Shell Homes, Inc., had the house burned
prior to Johnson's obtaining the policy with the defendant, John-
son would have been entitled to nothing for his lost equity, i.e.,
the excess over the amount necessary to satisfy the note and
mortgage given by him to Shell Homes, Inc. would not have
83. 245 S.C. 205, 140 S.E.2d 153 (1965).
84. Thomas v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 581, 137 S.E.2d 856 (1964).
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come to Johnson under the Atlantic policy even though he had
advanced the money to Shell Homes, Inc. for the premiums on
this policy. Mr. Justice Bussey concurred in the result of the
majority opinion without a decision so the nature of his reserva-
tion is unknown, but inasmuch as the majority opinion stated
that the evidence supported the trial judge's finding that the
parties "intended" to insure only their separate interests whereas
Mr. Justice Brailsford stated that the evidence did not support
such a finding, it is surmised that Mr. Justice Bussey agreed with
the principle of the dissent but felt the testimony supported the
trial judge's finding of intent. It is difficult to see how the trial
court in either the Thomas or the Johnson case made the findings
of "intent" in view of the parol evidence rule.
H2. Miscellaneous Insurance Cases
Parnell v. United Am. Ins. 0o.5 was another of those cases
where the plaintiff signed an application for health and accident
insurance indicating a good health history whereas in fact she
was in very poor health. Upon the defendant insurer learning
the truth it attempted an informal recission by a refund of pre-
mium, but the plaintiff refused this and instituted this action
for fraud and deceit, alleging that she had told the agent the
truth but he had falsified the application unknown to her, she
having signed it without reading it. In affirming a judgment
n. o. v. granted by the trial court after a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff for actual and punitive damages, the South Carolina
Supreme Court distinguished this case from other apparently
similar cases where verdicts were allowed to stand, on the
grounds that plaintiff was intelligent, literate, and had not
known the agent prior to meeting him at the time he gave his
sales' pitch, i.e., she had no right to rely upon the agent.
In Hudson v. Reserve Life Ins. 00.86 the plaintiff who had
taken out a health and accident policy in the defendant company
in 1954, which policy was still in force on April 10, 1961, when
a loss occurred, sought to have section 37-471: of the code87 which
limited the right of insurers to raise the defense of misstatements
in insurance applications, read into his policy even though such
section was passed in 1956, after his policy was issued. The theory
was that the section provided that health and accident policies
85. 246 S.C. 26, 142 S.E.2d 204 (1965).
86. 245 S.C. 615, 141 S.E.2d 926 (1965).
87. S.C. CODE AxN. § 37-474 (1962).
[Vol. 18
33
Kemmerlin: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
INSURANCE SURVEYED
issued thereafter must include the sought limitation, and, since
his policy was renewable annually, each annual renewal was a
new policy, so that from the date of the first renewal after the
effective date of the act, the sought limitation was present in his
policy. The South Carolina Supreme Court, affirming the lower
court opinion holding for the defendant, indicated that the plain-
tiff's theory would be correct, if each renewal premium created
a new contract, but that the policy language indicated no such
intention. The court pointed out that the policy provided for
waiting periods of up to six months before it became effective,
which under the plaintiff's theory would mean that, as to an ill-
ness covered by the waiting period, an insured would be without
coverage one half the time. Considering the contract language
as a whole, the court held that it evidenced one contract issued
in 1951- still in effect, not a series of one-year contracts.
In construing the requirement of the insuring agreement to
collect double indemnity that death "occurred in consequence of
bodily injury effected solely through external, violent, and acci-
dental means, of which . .. there is a visible contusion or wound
on the exterior of the body, .. .as a direct result thereof, inde-
pendently of other causes," the South Carolina Supreme Court
in Hill v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y~s held that the
testimony of witnesses as to the appearance of the deceased after
a heart attack (flushed) and after death (cyanotonic, i.e., a
bluish tint to the skin) did not meet the requirement that there
be a "visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body."
The court was careful to confine its ruling to the particular pol-
icy language involved, indicating that its decision might have
been different, if the language had required merely "visible sign
of injury" as some suicide clauses read.
In Elrod v. Prudence Mut. (as. Co. 9 the court was called upon
to construe the following policy provision by the plaintiff, the
wife of the deceased insured:
Any indemnity payable for loss of life benefits as provided
for in Part III shall be doubled if such Loss of Life is sus-
tained by the Insured while riding or driving in a private
automobile of the pleasure car design, which is involved in
an accident or if such Loss of Life is sustained by the In-
sured being struck by an automobile, truck, taxi cab or bus.00
88. 246 S.C. 133, 142 S.E2d 869 (1965).
89. 246 S.C. 129, 142 S.E.2d 857 (1965).
90. Id. at 131, 142 S.E2d at 857.
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The pickup truck which the insured was driving was struck by
a car and the insured was killed. The car did not strike the per-
son of the insured. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in af-
firming the lower court's verdict in favor of double indemnity
held the insured was "struck by" the automobile which collided
with his pickup truck within the policy provisions even though
it did not actually touch his body. Apparently the argument was
not made that the "struck by" clause applied only while the
insured was a pedestrian, which argument, if adopted, would
have left the plaintiff without double indemnity, since a pickup
truck is not "a private automobile of the pleasure car design."
In Owens v. Durham Life Ins. Co.91 the court acknowledged
the presumption against suicide as a presumption of law rather
than fact and after stating that the plaintiff, the wife and bene-
ficiary of the deceased, made out a prima facie case for the insur-
ance proceeds once she proved the policy terms, coverage, and
her husband's death, and after stating the burden was on the
insurer to establish its defense of suicide, held that the facts
overcame the presumption and the prima facie case and ruled in
favor of the defendant insurer. On the day of the deceased's
death he, while on a drinking spree, although he may have been
temporarily not drunk, bought a pistol, threatened suicide, and
was found alone in his home dead from a shot inflicted by the
pistol.
Burgess v. Life Ins. Co. of 17a.92 was a suit on a life insurance
policy but it announced no principle of insurance law, only hold-
ing that in a suit for policy proceeds where the claimant asserted
the premium had been paid and the defendant asserted it had not,
a jury issue was made.
Calhoun Life Ins. Co. v. GambreZZ93 is properly reviewable as
an administrative law rather than an insurance case. Even
though there was no statutory authority giving the insurance
commission authority to regulate credit life insurance rates or
credit health and accident rates, the commission on February 3,
1964, filed regulations controlling the rates on such insurance
and the allowable commissions for the writing of such insurance.
The plaintiff engaged in writing such insurance brought this
action to enjoin the enforcement of the regulations. The lower
court held, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed such
91. 240 F. Supp. 294 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
92. 245 S.C. 48, 138 S.E.2d 640 (1964).
93. 245 S.C. 406, 140 S.E.2d 774 (1965).
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holding, that the insurance commission as an administrative
agency unknown to common law, had only such powers as were
delegated to it by the general assembly, all legislative powers
of the state of South Carolina being in that body under the South
Carolina Constitution, and the statutes reveal no delegation of
the power to control the rules and commissions in question. The
argument of the commission that section 8-774 of the code4 pro-
viding that all insurance sold under the provisions of the Small
Loan Act, of which such section is a part, must "bear a reason-
able and bona fide relation to the existing hazard or risk of loss"
gave it the necessary regulatory powers was overruled, the court
pointing out that the state board of bank control is primarily
charged with the administration of the Small Loan Act, and
further that such section only meant that a lender under the
act could not require insurance having no relation to either the
risk of the lender in making the loan or any risk to the security
for the loan. The further argument of the commission that vari-
ous code sections giving it the right to regulate the financial
affairs of companies to protect their soundness gave it the right
to make the regulations was dismissed by the observation that
none of these sections by "necessary implication" authorized the
regulations. Finally the commission asserted that the plaintiff
should be denied equitable relief, i.e., the sought injunction, on
the grounds of unclean hands in that the plaintiff was violating
various provisions of the South Carolina Code relating to insur-
ance. The court pointed out that, if the commission was correct,
it had recourse to various provisions of the code to prevent such
abuses.
Tedder 'v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.9 5 involved the interpretation
of the following clause in the fire insurance policy issued to the
plaintiff by the defendant:
It shall be optional with this company to take all or any
part of the property at the agreed or appraised value and
also to repair, rebuild or replace the property destroyed or
damaged with other of like kind and quality within a reason-
able time, on given notice of its intention so to do within 30
days after the receipt of the proof of loss herein required.00
Upon a total loss and the timely filing of a proof of loss in the
amount of the agreed value under the policy, the defendant
94. S.C. CoDF ANN. § 8-774 (1962).
95. 246 S.C. 163, 143 S.E.2d 122 (1965).
96. Id. at 164, 143 S.E.2d at 122.
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sought to exercise its election under the quoted provision to re-
build. The plaintiff refused to allow this and instituted this
action for the agreed value. The case went to the jury only on
the question of whether the defendant had complied with its
policy provision by making a good faith attempt to replace the
house within a reasonable time, which question the jury answered
negatively in finding for the plaintiff. On appeal the only ques-
tion presented was whether the evidence sustained this jury find-
ing. The court held that the evidence did not justify the jury so
finding, but went on to apply Rule 4, Section 8 of its Rules al-
lowing the court to sustain a ruling on any grounds appearing in
the record and concluded that on the basis of section 37-154 of
the code97 the decision below for the wrong reason reached the
correct result. Such section provides:
No company writing fire insurance policies doing business in
this State, shall issue a policy for more than the value stated
in the policy or the value of the property to be insured, the
amount of insurance to be fixed by the insurer and insured
at or before the time of issuing the policy. In case of total
loss by fire the insured shall be entitled to recover the full
amount of insurance, and in case of a partial loss the insured
shall be entitled to recover the actual amount of the loss, but
in no event more than the amount of the insurance stated in
the contract.
The court concluded that the rebuilding provision was contrary
to the plain wording of the statute that the insured "shall be
entitled to recover the full amount of the insurance," and was
therefore void.
Three other cases98 decided during the survey period touched
upon insurance principles, but are not here considered, since they
are more properly reviewable in other areas of this survey.
L Legislative Enactments
From an insurance viewpoint the first year of the 1964-65 ses-
sion of the General Assembly of South Carolina, the period fall-
ing within the survey, was a quiet one. Only two acts of relative
unimportance, at least from the viewpoint of the practicing at-
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-154 (1962).
98. Cook v. Canal Ins. Co., 245 S.C. 238, 140 S.E.2d 166 (1965) ; Philco Fin.
Corp. v. Mehlman, 245 S.C. 139, 139 S.E.2d 475 (1964); United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 244 S.C. 436, 137 S.E.2d 582 (1964).
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torney, were passed: Act No. 910, 99 amending the Standard Non-
forfeiture Law, sections 37-171 to -175.7 South Carolina Code
and Act No. 1001,100 amending the Unfair Practices Law, sec-
tions 37-1201 to -1223 South Carolina Code.
99. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1964, p. 2139.
100. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1964, p. 2293.
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